Zero Trust security
ZTNA · Access control · VPN alternatives · SASE
VPN assumes that once you are inside, you are trusted — so one leaked credential hands over the whole network. Zero Trust inverts it: every request is checked against identity, device state and context, and access is granted per application, never to the network. For companies with overseas teams and contractors this is not only a security upgrade, it lowers operational load too.
If this sounds familiar
- Employees, contractors and vendors all reach internal systems through one VPN, with coarse permissions
- VPN clients are fragile, overseas sessions drop, and half of IT tickets are network issues
- Internal tools are exposed to the internet behind nothing but a login page
- You cannot verify whether a device is compliant (patches, AV, disk encryption)
- Access is not revoked promptly when people leave or contracts end
- With multiple offices, audit trails and compliance evidence are getting harder to produce
What we put in place
ZTNA application access
Internal apps are never exposed to the internet. Identity and device posture are checked first, then access is granted per application. Users cannot see the network; attackers cannot scan it.
Capability detail →Identity and device posture
SSO and MFA through your IdP (Okta, Entra ID, Google and others), combined with device compliance checks as access conditions — "who" and "from what device" evaluated together.
VPN replacement and remote work
Replace legacy VPN remote access. Overseas and remote users attach to a nearby edge node instead of backhauling to a head-office exit — usually a clear experience improvement.
Capability detail →SASE and secure web gateway
DNS filtering, URL categorisation and threat blocking at the edge, consolidating egress policy — moving the office network exit out of the datacentre and onto the edge.
Capability detail →Boundaries and prerequisites
- Zero Trust governs access; it does not secure the endpoint itself. Device posture checks need an endpoint agent or MDM
- Systems relying on non-web protocols (some client-server apps, custom ports) need separate assessment and may still require a gateway or tunnel
- The quality of your identity source sets the ceiling. If the IdP is a mess, do account hygiene before migrating
- Plan to run VPN in parallel for a transition period — do not schedule a hard cutover
Common questions
How is this different from a VPN in practice?
A VPN grants network-level access and allows lateral movement. Zero Trust grants application-level authorisation — users cannot see or reach anything else. Users also stop backhauling to a head-office exit, so overseas access is usually faster and more stable.
Do internal systems need changes?
Most web applications need none — they sit behind an identity-aware proxy. What usually needs work are hardcoded IP allowlists, custom-protocol clients, and auth logic that assumes the intranet is trusted.
Does this make life harder for IT?
There is a learning curve, but it pays back: permissions follow identity instead of network location, joiners and leavers are automated, and VPN-client tickets drop sharply.